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Three Years Post-KSR: A Practitioner’s Guide to 
“Winning” Arguments on Obviousness and a 
Look at What May Lay Ahead 
By Katherine M. L. Hayes* 
¶1 In 2007, the United States Supreme Court decided KSR International Company v. 
Teleflex Inc.1  Many called KSR the most important patent ruling in years.2  Fried Frank 
hailed the decision as “greatly lowering the cost and uncertainty of patent litigation.”3  
Akin Gump suggested a more limited effect: “[T]he justices wanted to make it harder to 
get a patent.  What’s not immediately clear is how far they want to go.”4  As some law 
firms offered their clients “Survival Guides” to the post-KSR world, a minority of lawyers 
suggested KSR would actually have a limited effect on patenting.5  
¶2 In the three years since KSR, the patent bar, academia, and the lower courts have 
struggled to define the new boundaries of the obviousness test.  In particular, because 
KSR invalidated a mechanical patent, its application to other arts, like chemistry and 
biology, has been less clear.  As a result, the Federal Circuit has been cautious in its 
application of KSR.6  Yet, scrutiny of post-KSR cases reveals some patterns.  This article 
 
* Northwestern Law, J.D. Candidate 2011.  There were a variety of people who supported me while 
writing this piece.  Particular thanks go to my mother, Eileen Larkin, who, in addition to being supportive, 
has been my lifetime editor and the first person I go to for an academic reality check.  I also need to thank 
my sister, Kim Hayes, and partner, Jonathon Wong, for their patience and support when I had lost patience 
with myself. 
1 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
2 Linda Greenhouse, High Court Puts Limits on Patents, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2007, at C1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/01/business/01bizcourt.html?_r=2&ref=business&oref=slogin (calling 
KSR the Court’s “most important patent ruling in years”).  See also Peter Lattman, KSR v. Teleflex: The 
Supreme Court’s Big Patent Ruling, WALL STREET J. L. BLOG (May 1, 2007, 8:07 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/01/ksr-v-teleflex-the-supreme-courts-big-patent-ruling/ (quoting Michael 
Barclay of Wilson Sonsini as saying, “thus this is the most important patent case of the last 20 years and 
perhaps since the passage of the 1952 Patent Act.”).  
3 Lattman, supra note 2 (quoting James Dabney of Fried Frank, lawyer for KSR). 
4 Id. (quoting Thomas Goldstein of Akin Gump, lawyers for Teleflex).  At the same time, Mr. Goldstein 
recognized the importance of KSR: “[O]bviousness is the most important legal gateway to patenting, and 
the future of the modern economy rests on intellectual property.  So there are trillions of dollars at stake.”  
Id.  Some district courts also reflected on whether KSR constituted a major change in the law, albeit in the 
context of issue preclusion.  See Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Aptoex, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 985, 996–97 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (discussing without deciding the effect of KSR on issue preclusion).   
5 See, e.g., Crowell Moring, Post-KSR Patent Prosecution “Survival Guide,” CROWELL MORING (May 
16, 2007), http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/Newsletter.aspx?id=407; Gerald J. Mossinghoff, KSR v. 
Teleflex: High Court’s “Obviousness” Ruling No Sea Change in Patent Law, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (June 8, 2007), http://www.wlf.org/upload/06-08-07mossing.pdf (arguing that the 
practical realities (e.g. most patent examiners are recently graduated engineers) and restraints (e.g. time to 
process a patent) will mean KSR will have very little impact on the number of patents granted each year).  
In addition, Mossinghoff argues that the Court’s reliance on prior precedent in establishing the new 
standard suggests that the new KSR standard is not actually “new.”  Id.  
6 Shuffle Master, Inc. v. MP Games LLC, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1222 (D. Nev. 2008) (noting the 
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reviews the Federal Circuit and some district court decisions since the Supreme Court 
changed the obviousness standard.  In the process, successful methods of argument 
become apparent, providing a roadmap to the practitioner’s post-KSR world.  The 
analysis shows that KSR’s impact has differed based on the patented art.  While KSR has 
only tweaked chemical patent inquiries, its effect on mechanical patent validity has been 
substantial.  
¶3 Perhaps the most influential portion of the Supreme Court’s KSR opinion has been 
the language concluding that a combination resulting from a “finite number of 
identifiable predictable solutions” is likely obvious.7  That language has left litigators and 
lower courts grasping for what makes any number of solutions finite, identifiable, or 
predictable.  The Court also held that a person of skill in the art (“POSA”) is “one of 
ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”8  Because the POSA’s creativity will vary with 
his skill level, KSR has also renewed emphasis on the importance of the POSA’s level of 
skill.  When carried to its extreme, emphasis on the POSA increases the likelihood of 
future procedural challenges to patent case law.  Typically, parties agree on the definition 
of a POSA.  If, however, the definition of a POSA becomes a larger issue post-KSR, the 
new question may be the sufficiency of evidence necessary for the court to determine the 
POSA’s level of skill and then rule on obviousness on summary judgment.  
¶4 This article proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides an introduction to obviousness.  
Part II dissects the KSR decision, including the unanswered questions, which become the 
basis for a discussion of what practitioners should consider today.  Part III analyzes how 
the lower courts have defined, changed, and extended KSR’s bounds.  Cases are analyzed 
in two categories: chemical arts and mechanical/electrical arts.  After KSR, many lawyers 
expected higher success rates for invalidating all patents.  The reality, three years later, is 
different than many expected.  While a valid mechanical patent is a rare exception, the 
effect of KSR on the chemical arts is significantly less pronounced.  Part IV explains what 
arguments are most persuasive and how practitioners can exploit them most easily.  The 
conclusion considers the road ahead.  What arenas remain open for extension and what 
new arguments should be tested?  
I. INTRODUCTION TO OBVIOUSNESS 
¶5 In 1952, Congress codified “obviousness” at 35 U.S.C. § 103:  
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of this title [35 U.S.C § 102], if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains.9  
 
Federal Circuit has been “sensitive to the varying levels of relevance [of] the TSM test”). 
7 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). 
8 Id. at 421. 
9 Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd, 492 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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Far from changing the law, the Supreme Court construed § 103 as “intended to codify 
judicial precedents” first announced in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood years earlier.10 
¶6 In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Court defined the obviousness test under Section 
103.  Prima facie obviousness depends on: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) 
the level of ordinary skill in the art, (3) the difference between the claimed invention and 
the prior art, and (4) any evidence of secondary factors.11  A court must consider 
secondary considerations if the challenger12 demonstrates a prima facie case.13  While 
obviousness is a question of law, the Graham factors are questions of fact.14  Thus, a 
conflict over the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art should be submitted to the 
jury, but the court makes the ultimate determination on obviousness. 
¶7 The Federal Circuit extended Graham by adding the Teaching, Suggestion, or 
Motivation test (“the TSM test”).15  The court held that, where the prior art offered the 
solution described in the patent, there must be a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to 
combine the prior art teachings.16  The teaching, suggestion, or motivation can be found 
in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a POSA.17  The TSM test 
governed obviousness until the Supreme Court decided KSR.  
II. KSR INTERNATIONAL CO. V. TELEFLEX INC. 
¶8 In KSR, the Court considered Teleflex-owned U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565 B1 (“the 
‘565 patent”), which combined an adjustable automobile pedal with an electronic sensor 
that ultimately controlled the throttle.18  The district court found the ‘565 patent obvious 
based on the Rixon and Smith patents.  When combined, the two patents taught both the 
adjustable pedal and the electronic sensor for throttle control.19  The district court applied 
 
10 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).  For further analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
obviousness jurisprudence see MATTHEW BENDER, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS 
Instruction 17 Obviousness (LexisNexis Group, 2009).  
11 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.  Secondary factors, also known as secondary considerations, include: 
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others which “might be utilized to give 
light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.”  Id.  
12 Throughout this article, I use “challenger” to refer to the party challenging the validity of the patent 
regardless of whether they do so as a plaintiff or a defendant.  
13 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit has been more forceful in outlining the value 
of secondary considerations and one could read the court’s precedent as requiring a court to weigh 
secondary considerations as part of the prima facie test.  See generally Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 
713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Thus evidence rising out of the so-called ‘secondary 
considerations’ must always when present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness . . . . 
Indeed, evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the 
record.  It may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was 
not.”); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refactories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 306 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Thus, the 
district court seemingly recognized the holdings of this court vis-a-vis secondary considerations, to wit, that 
all relevant evidence going to the issue of obviousness/nonobviousness, which includes properly presented 
evidence on secondary considerations, must have been considered prior to reaching a conclusion on 
obviousness/nonobviousness.”).   
14 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.  
15 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007). 
16 Id. at 407 (citing Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).  
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 405. 
19 Id. at 413.  The court found the Rixon patent provided a basis for the combination, and the Smith 
patent taught a solution to the wire chafing problems Rixon identified.  Id.  
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the TSM test and found the POSA had sufficient motivation to combine the prior art 
based on the industry preference for adjustable pedals and electronic control of the 
throttle.  The Federal Circuit reversed, finding the district court failed to make specific 
findings about what principle in the prior art would have motivated the POSA to combine 
the prior art teachings.20 
¶9 The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s “rigid” approach to the 
obviousness inquiry.  The Court went on to make five observations which have been 
influential since:21  
(1) Combination patents must be treated with greater flexibility when 
considering obviousness. 
(2) The TSM test has value and the Court’s opinion should not be interpreted as 
a wholesale rejection of it. 
(3) Market demands or well-known and, as yet, unsolved problems in an industry 
may supply the POSA’s motivation to combine prior art. 
(4) The base of prior art from which a court makes an obviousness determination 
can be expansive and the court may look beyond the immediate field of the 
patent in suit.  
(5) “Obvious to try” may mean obvious.  
Each of these observations is explored in greater detail below. 
¶10 Combination Patents: The Court found the “rigid” TSM test particularly 
problematic when applied to combination patents.   While the Court recognized that 
“inventions . . . rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries 
almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known,”  the 
Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s approach to the combination in KSR, holding that 
using known methods to combine familiar elements is likely to be obvious, particularly 
when the results are as expected.   A POSA confronted with a need and a limited 
number of solutions is expected to attempt the known solutions.   Thus, when the patent-
in-suit teaches one of the potential solutions, it is likely the product of ordinary skill and 







20 Id. at 413–14.  
21 See BENDER, supra note 10, at Instruction 17 Obviousness (offering one view on how these holdings 
translate to jury instructions).  But see Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, 
Preliminary Relief, and Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995, 1028–35 (2008) 
(Offering a competing view that in KSR, the Court laid the groundwork to alter the effect of the 
presumption of validity granted to patents issued by the PTO.  Sarnoff argues that while the Court did not 
reach the issue explicitly, the Court’s analysis can be read as shifting the burdens of production and 
persuasion in the context of combination patents to the patent-holder.).  
22 KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–16 (“For over half a century, the Court has held that a ‘patent for a combination 
which only unites old elements with no change in their respective functions . . . obviously withdraws what 
is already known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men.’”) 
(citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)). 
23 Id. at 418–19.  
24 Id. at 416. 
25 Id. at 421.  
26 Id. 
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still performs as it would have separately is obvious, unless the prior art also teaches 
away from using the claimed method.   27
¶11 The Court foreclosed the argument that KSR is distinguishable based on the relative 
simplicity of the ‘565 patent when it recognized that many combination patents would be 
more complex than the one currently before it.28  The Court suggested that more complex 
combination patents require that a court: 
Look to the interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands 
known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the 
background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all 
in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the 
known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.29  
Thus, the Court expanded the factors that the lower courts should address when 
considering an obviousness argument on a combination, in particular, elevating the 
importance of economic demands.  
¶12 TSM Test Still Applicable: Despite overturning the Federal Circuit’s finding and 
describing the TSM test as “rigid,” the Court did not reject the TSM test in its entirety.   
The TSM test “captured a helpful insight” that the presence of known elements in a 
patent is insufficient, on its own, to render the patent obvious.   Rather, a court must 
identify some motivation for the POSA to combine the known elements.   The test 
needed greater flexibility which the Court introduced by broadening the factors that 
might constitute motivation, placing a particular emphasis on economic demands in the 





¶13 Market Approach: Where an invention solves a well-known market demand, the 
demand is sufficient to motivate the POSA to seek out and combine known solutions.  
The Court held, “Any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of the 
invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in 
the manner claimed.”   Thus, if the patent solves a known market problem (e.g. wire 34
 
27 Id. at 413, 416.  “[W]hen the prior art teaches away from combining certain known elements, 
discovery of a successful means of combining them is more likely to be nonobvious.”  Id. at 416. (citing 
United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51–52 (1966)). 
28 Id. at 417 (“Following these principles may be more difficult in other cases than it is here because the 
claimed subject matter may involve more than the simple substitution of one known element for another or 
the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement.”). 
29 Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).  
30 Some lower courts struggle to see exactly what the Court endorsed about the TSM test.  See, e.g., 
Shuffle Master, Inc. v. MP Games LLC, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1221–22 (D. Nev. 2008) (offering a 
“summary of errors” the Supreme Court found with the TSM test). 
31 KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. 
32 Id. 
33 Gene Quinn, Editor of the IPWatchdog.com Blog, has opined (cleverly) on motivations for innovation 
by comparing them to the seven deadly sins.  Among other things, Quinn suggests that “envy” of another’s 
products is one of the great motivators of patent innovation.  Product envy is, arguably, a type of market-
driven innovation.  Gene Quinn, Motivation for Success: The 7 Deadly Sins Patent Style, IPWATCHDOG  
(Feb. 11, 2010, 3:05 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/02/11/motivation-for-success-the-7-deadly-
sins-patent-style/id=8835/.  
34 KSR, 550 U.S. at 420.  
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chafing as a result of an adjustable pedal) and does so using a known solution (e.g., the 
Smith patent), then the patent is obvious.  
¶14 Broad Base of Prior Art: The Court also increased the flexibility of the TSM test by 
broadening the scope of the POSA’s search for a potential solution.  A POSA is not 
limited to the art designed to solve the same problem, because a POSA “will be able to fit 
the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”   Far from being 
limited to the most obvious solutions, “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of 
ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”   The POSA will be able to look beyond the 




¶15 Obvious to Try May Mean Obvious: Where the patent addresses a problem with a 
finite and predictable number of solutions which would be “obvious to try,” the patent 
may be obvious.  A POSA, operating against market pressures, would naturally pursue 
obvious options first.   If those options yield success, the combination was obvious to 
try.   In KSR, there was one easily identifiable solution which was obvious to try, 
therefore rendering the patent obvious.   
38
39
III. THE LOWER COURTS POST-KSR 
¶16 Over the last three years, the lower courts have worked to define more exact 
bounds for KSR.  Several recurring issues should be highlighted here.  First, because the 
Supreme Court explicitly recognized the simplicity of the combination in the ‘565 patent, 
and the ‘565 patent combined two mechanical patents that offer less complexity than the 
variety of reactions that can occur when two chemicals are combined, lower courts have 
struggled to find the bounds of KSR’s application to other arts.  Analogizing the 
“combination of known elements” analysis has been particularly problematic for 
chemical patents, where known elements were combined but were non-obvious based on 
the reaction from the combination.  The solution has been to redefine KSR, particularly 
for chemical patents.   
¶17 The Supreme Court also increased the flexibility of the test for the POSA’s 
motivation.  Lower courts have looked for bounds to a POSA’s motivation and have 
found them in the POSA’s level of skill in the art.  The Court also emphasized the 
importance of a finite number of identifiable and predictable solutions which render a 
patent obvious.  But what is a “finite” number?  The Federal Circuit has offered some 
guidance.   
¶18 This section examines how the lower courts have approached obviousness post-
KSR. Selected cases are divided by the art: chemical and mechanical/electrical.  As 
divided, lines of argument emerge and the reinterpreted bounds of KSR begin to take 
 
35 Id. at 420. 
36 Id. at 421. 
37 Indeed the internet has simplified the task for an inventor who seeks a variety of potential solutions to 
any given problem.  For example, Google Patents allows one to search over 7 million patents by 
performing a normal Google search.  See GOOGLE PATENTS, http://www.google.com/patents (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2010).  The PTO also offers access to its full text and full page image databases online.  U.S. 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Patent Full Text and Full Page Image Databases, http://patft.uspto.gov/ 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2010).   
38 KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. 
39 Id.  
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some shape.  KSR’s exact bounds, and how practitioners can use these lines of argument, 
will be examined in Part IV.  
A. Chemical Cases 
¶19 Immediately after KSR, many predicted a major change in the patentability of 
pharmaceuticals.40  Lending credence to the doomsday predictions was the Federal 
Circuit’s first obviousness case following KSR, Pfizer v. Apotex.41  Apotex filed an 
ANDA42 application seeking approval to sell Pfizer’s Norvasc which was covered by 
U.S. Patent No. 4,879,303 (“the ‘303 patent”).43  Pfizer filed a patent infringement suit; 
Apotex asserted the ‘303 patent was invalid for obviousness.  The District Court entered 
final judgment for Pfizer finding the patent valid, and the Federal Circuit reversed.44  
¶20 Pfizer developed and patented Norvasc, a besylate salt form of amlodipine, which 
is an active ingredient used to treat hypertension and certain types of angina.45  Pfizer 
held the patent for amlodipine and claimed the ‘303 patent taught the most commercially 
viable delivery method for the drug because the besylate salt form of amlodipine resulted 
in the lowest incidence of side effects.46  Apotex argued that the patent for the 
amlodipine, combined with a second patent by Berge (“the Berge patent”) which 
identified the salt forms that were most pharmaceutically acceptable, offered a potential 
solution.47  Commercial viability would have motivated the POSA to find the best salt, 
and through routine optimization tests, the POSA would have settled on the besylate 
salt.48  Pfizer argued the besylate salt form was nonobvious because (1) the patent for 
amlodipine did not suggest the use of a salt with cyclic anions like a besylate salt, (2) that 
even combining the amlodipine patent with Berge did not render the besylate salt form 
 
40 See, e.g., Mossinghoff, supra note 5; Janice M. Mueller, Chemicals, Combinations, and “Common 
Sense”: How the Supreme Court’s KSR Decision is Changing Federal Circuit Obviousness 
Determinations in Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Cases, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 281, 281 (2008) (“By 
invoking ambiguous, non-statutory terms and circular statements, the Supreme Court’s KSR decision 
injected greater uncertainty into an already complicated analysis.”); Harold C. Wegner, Chemical and 
Biotechnology Obviousness in a State of Flux, BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP., Oct. 2007, at 437, 437 (“KSR and 
Pfizer v. Apotex have provoked critical rethinking of long-standing principles of U.S. chemical patent law 
of great importance to the chemical, and particularly, the pharmaceutical industry, with sharp implications 
also for biotechnology.”).  Wegner’s article also offers a good history of obviousness in the chemical 
compound context.  
41 Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reconsideration denied, 488 F.3d 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 2007).  
42 ANDA stands for Abbreviated New Drug Application.  Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, an ANDA 
application constitutes an “artificial” act of infringement which confers subject matter jurisdiction on the 
federal courts.  See, e.g., Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 05-1887, 2009 WL 
3754170, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2009) (order on motions in limine) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006)).  
If, however, the defendant proves the patent is invalid, the defendant may market the generic version of the 
drug.   
43 Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1352. 
44 Id. at 1352–53. 
45 Id. at 1352.   
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 1363. 
48 Id. at 1361–62.  For criticism of the court’s optimization analysis, see Wegner, supra note 40, at 452–
43 (arguing that the Pfizer decision improperly relegated therapeutic properties to secondary considerations 
when a court should consider all properties, including therapeutic properties, when determining chemical 
obviousness). 
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obvious because the Berge patent taught that besylate salt was rarely used (0.25%) in the 
pharmaceutical industry, and finally (3) that the references are irrelevant because the 
besylate salt form disclosed in Berge was never used with an active ingredient like 
amlodipine.49   
¶21 The district court found the prior art did not offer the requisite motivation because 
the prior art did not disclose the use of besylate salt to treat hypertension or angina (the 
primary use of Norvasc).50  The Federal Circuit held that to provide the requisite 
motivation, the prior art need not show that the salt’s use with the active ingredient was 
known; it need only show that the salt was known and that it solved the problems a 
POSA would have been attempting to solve.51 
¶22 The Federal Circuit decided Pfizer v. Apotex in March 2007, just before the April 
2007 decision in KSR.  But Pfizer filed a motion for reconsideration, making it one of the 
first cases before the Federal Circuit under the new KSR standard.  Extensive amicus 
briefing on the importance of commercialization factors in determining obviousness did 
not sway the court, and it upheld its previous decision.52  Judge Lourie’s dissent 
emphasized his concern about the exceptional importance of obviousness to the 
pharmaceutical industries.53  
¶23 The Federal Circuit next addressed obviousness in Takeda Chemical Industries, 
LTD. v. Alphapharm Party, LTD.  Takeda owns U.S. Patent 4,687,777 (“the ‘777 patent”) 
which discloses compounds of Thiazolidinediones (“TZDs”) for use in controlling 
diabetes.54  Takeda first discovered the class of drugs known as TZDs in the 1970’s, but 
the ‘777 patent (similarly to Norvasc in Pfizer v. Apotex) covered a drug formulation with 
strong pharmacological effects and low side effects.55  The district court relied on a pre-
KSR test for chemical patent obviousness: the lead compound analysis.56  The court 
affirmed that the lead compound analysis remained relevant post-KSR: “it remains 
necessary to identify [a lead compound and] some reason that would have led a chemist 
to modify a known compound in a particular manner.”57  The court reasoned that since 
chemical compound obviousness typically turns on structural similarities and differences 
between the patent and the prior art, post-KSR, the test still requires the challenger to 
select and then modify a known compound based on the prior art.58  Alphapharm failed to 
prove a POSA’s motivation to select the lead compound, “compound b.”59  The district 
court also credited Takeda’s argument that the prior art actually taught away from the use 
 
49 Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1361–62. 
50 Id. at 1363.  
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 1378. 
53 Id. at 1383.  Janice Mueller argues Pfizer can be read in one of three ways: (1) a decision that 
“radically alter[s] the landscape of chemical non-obviousness” by holding that “‘obvious to try’ evidence 
may indeed be probative of . . . obviousness” (2) a decision limited to its facts or (3) “another in a series of 
cases in which the Federal Circuit rejected a patentee’s attempt to extend its period of exclusivity by 
obtaining a second patent on a derivative form of a compound.”  Mueller, supra note 400, at 288.  
54 Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd, 492 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
55 Id. at 1352. 
56 Id. at 1356. 
57 Id. at 1357.  
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1353.  
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of compound b making it an unlikely starting point for the POSA.60  Without a lead 
compound, Alphapharm failed to make out a prima facie case.61  
¶24 The Federal Circuit upheld the ruling.62  The court found that Alphapharm’s prior 
art citations disclosed “hundreds of millions” of TZD compounds which taught away 
from “compound b” and suggested other compounds were more likely to be successful.63  
Since Alphapharm’s argument depended on starting from “compound b”, the Federal 
Circuit upheld the patent’s validity.64  
¶25 The Federal Circuit also distinguished its holding in Pfizer v. Apotex.  Pfizer was 
based on prior art that “narrow[ed] the genus of fifty-three pharmaceutically-acceptable 
anions to a few including [the one ultimately chosen by Pfizer].”65  By contrast, in 
Takeda, the POSA would have chosen from “over ninety” compounds and would have 
chosen one other than “compound b” which had known toxicity and side-effects.66  
Takeda demonstrates that the lead compound analysis remains relevant post-KSR, and the 
“number” of predictable identifiable solutions discussed in KSR should be “a few” and 
something less than fifty-three.67  
¶26 In McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Perrigo Co, another chemical compound case arising from 
an ANDA filing,68 Perrigo alleged McNeil’s U.S. Patent No. 5, 817,340 (“the ‘340 
patent”) was invalid for obviousness.69  The ‘340 patent disclosed an impermeable 
coating to mask the bitter taste of the active ingredient in Pepcid AC.70  The court found 
that all of the relevant limitations of the ‘340 patent—the combination to create the drug 
and the impermeable coating—were known in the prior art.71  Moreover, under KSR, a 
POSA would have been motivated to combine the teachings to mask the bitter taste of the 
active ingredient and make the drug more marketable.72   
¶27 The court also reaffirmed another pre-KSR holding.  McNeil argued a POSA would 
have avoided the impermeable coating because of the costs of production.73  The court 
rejected this argument and held that a business person’s reasons for rejecting a solution 
are not equivalent to a POSA’s.74  Only the POSA’s reasoning is relevant in an 
 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  The court also found that even if Alphaharm had made a prima facie case, it would be rebutted by 
the unexpected results of the ‘377 patent’s nontoxicity. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1357–59.  
64 Id. at 1357–58. 
65 Id. at 1360 (emphasis added).  
66 Id.  
67 The “less than fifty-three” number can be assumed.  The court distinguished Pfizer from Takeda 
because the fifty-three potential compounds had been narrowed to a “few” in Pfizer, suggesting that fifty-
three would have been too many.  For a litigator opposing a patent’s validity, Aventis Pharma Deutschland 
v. Lupin Ltd. offers a possible line of argument for limiting the number of solutions.  Where the drug came 
from a large family of drugs known to treat blood pressure, a more purified form of the drug was obvious.  
Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2007).   
68 For more information on ANDAs, see supra note 422. 
69 Merck markets McNeil’s patent as the over-the-counter drug, Pepcid Complete, which treats a variety 
of stomach acid disorders. 
70 McNeil-PPC, Inc., v. Perrigo Co., 516 F. Supp. 2d 238, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
71 Id. at 250. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 250–51. 
74 Id. at 251. 
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obviousness determination.75  While the market may provide the motivation to solve a 
POSA’s problem, it does not provide a similar restraint on the POSA’s investigation.  
Thus, the market cannot limit the POSA’s search for solutions.  
¶28 In March 2008, the Federal Circuit, in Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Mylan 
Laboratories, Inc., considered Ortho-McNeil’s U.S. Patent No. 4,513,006 (the ‘006 
patent), which teaches the formation of the anticonvulsive drug Topiramate.76  The doctor 
who discovered Topiramate did so while testing for diabetes drugs but found one of the 
intermediates exhibited anticonvulsing properties.  Ortho-McNeil then completed 
extensive testing to show the compound was safe and effective for treating seizure-related 
diseases.77  Mylan asserted that Topiramate was obvious, because a POSA looking for a 
new diabetes drug would necessarily design a drug from the class of drugs Topiramate 
was in.78  Citing KSR, Mylan argued that the class of drugs represented “a finite number 
of identified predictable solutions.”79  
¶29 The court held the record did not present “a finite . . . number of options easily 
traversed to show obviousness.”80  There were a number of motivational problems: (1) 
the POSA would be unlikely to start with the particular chemical formulation Dr. 
Maryanoff did, (2) the POSA “would have to have some reason to select (among several 
unpredictable alternatives) the exact route that produced Topiramate,” and (3) the POSA 
would have had to stop and test the intermediate for properties related to epilepsy 
(without any idea about the value of Topiramate).81  The court concluded, “this clearly is 
not the easily traversed, small and finite number of alternatives that KSR suggested might 
support an inference of obviousness.”82  Additionally, the court found Mylan relied on 
hindsight-driven analysis.83  While the TSM test, flexibly applied, allows for a broad 
range of motivators, Mylan’s expert ignored multiple paths to solutions and discounted 
the complexity of the alternatives.84 
¶30 Next, in Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd., the court considered 
Eisai’s Rabeprazole.85  In Eisai, the Federal Circuit explicitly analyzed how the lead 
compound analysis operated under the more flexible KSR standard.  To maintain 
flexibility, “the requisite motivation can come from any number of sources and need not 
necessarily be explicit in the art.”86  The court explained:  
The Supreme Court’s analysis in KSR thus relies on several assumptions about 
the prior art landscape.  First, KSR assumes a starting point or points in the art, 
prior to the time of invention, from which a skilled artisan might identify a 
 
75 Id.  
76 Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 1364. 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  Rabeprazole is 
marketed as Aciphex. 
86 Id. at 1357 (citing Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 
2007)).  
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problem and pursue potential solutions. Second, KSR presupposes that the record 
up to the time of invention would give some reasons, available within the 
knowledge of one of skill in the art, to make particular modifications to achieve 
the claimed compound. Third, the Supreme Court’s analysis in KSR presumes 
that the record before the time of invention would supply some reasons for 
narrowing the prior art universe to a “finite number of identified predictable 
solutions.”87  
The court further explained, “To the extent an art is unpredictable, as the chemical arts 
often are, KSR’s focus on these ‘identified, predictable solutions’ may present a difficult 
hurdle because potential solutions are less likely to be genuinely predictable.”88  The 
court concluded that post-KSR, the obviousness inquiry for a chemical compound still 
begins with a lead compound.89  
¶31 Teva claimed Lansoprazole as a lead compound.  According to Teva, a POSA 
would have started by removing the fluorinated substituent from Lansoprazole to get to 
Rabeprazole.90  The court, however, found no motivation to remove from Lansoprazole 
the fluorinated substituent which made it more effective.91  Thus, in Eisai, while Teva 
chose an appropriate lead compound, it failed to logically explain what motivation the 
POSA would have had to take the first step necessary to arrive at the claimed compound. 
¶32 March 2009 brought the consideration of Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.  In Procter & Gamble, the Federal Circuit considered a 
district court’s holding that U.S. Patent 5,583,122 (“the ‘122 patent) was valid over 
obviousness defenses asserted by Teva.  The ‘122 patent covers Risedronate, the active 
ingredient in Procter and Gamble’s (“P & G”) Actonel which treats osteoporosis.92  The 
district court relied on arguments from Takeda and Eisai, finding that Teva’s prior art 
citations would not have led a POSA to identify 2-pyr EHDP as the lead compound, a 
POSA would not have been “motivated to make the specific molecular modifications to 
make Risedronate,” and secondary considerations supported these findings.93  
¶33 In sum, the chemical patent cases have affirmed much of the pre-KSR precedent.  
Many feared that the “obvious to try” analysis in KSR, combined with the optimization 
language from Pfizer v. Apotex, meant chemical patents would be invalidated with ease 
on a theory that a POSA would find a combination obvious to try and then optimize to 
reach the specified chemical levels.  But the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of KSR has 
significantly limited its impact on chemical compounds.  The lead compound analysis is 
still the test for invalidating chemical patents.  The Federal Circuit further constrained the 
obvious to try analysis by suggesting that the number of options available to a POSA 
should be limited to “a few” and finding that more than fifty-three options are too 
many.94  Finally, the optimization holding in Pfizer v. Apotex has simply not had the 
 
87 Id. at 1359 (citations omitted). 
88 Id. (citing Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1358.  
92 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
93 Id. at 993. 
94 Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd, 492 F.3d 1350, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  Of 
course practitioners can always argue that a broader number of options is not as broad as an initial review 
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strength many feared in the immediate aftermath of KSR.  These limitations suggest a less 
expansive obvious to try analysis than supporters of the pharmaceutical industry had 
feared.  
¶34 Meanwhile, KSR’s instruction to survey market pressures has had an effect, as seen 
in McNeil v. Perrigo.  The problem of bitter taste was known.  The purpose of the 
impermeable coating was to make the drug more palatable.  Because a method for 
creating an impermeable coating was known, the combination of the active drug and the 
coating was obvious.  In short, KSR’s impact has been felt in the chemical patent context, 
but it has been less than the armageddon many had expected.  
B. District Courts and Chemical Cases 
¶35  As the analysis below shows, district court decisions have followed the Federal 
Circuit’s gloss on post-KSR analysis in the chemical context more closely than KSR itself.  
Probably the most distinctive feature of the district court opinions is the development of 
the secondary considerations analysis.  Although secondary considerations operate 
primarily to negate a prima facie case of obviousness, many district courts, while finding 
against the challenger on the basis of the prima facie case, write lengthy opinions 
explaining why secondary considerations also support the initial finding of non-
obviousness.95 
¶36 Other district courts have considered KSR’s “obvious to try” standard in light of the 
clear and convincing burden a challenger faces when attempting to invalidate a patent.96  
The heightened burden has been most significant for a challenger to overcome where the 
patentee is able to cite pieces of prior art that teach away from the combination claimed 
by the patent-in-suit.  Courts have noted that where prior art teaches away, the challenger 
simply cannot meet the clear and convincing burden placed on it as a result of the 
deference due to the PTO.97  
¶37 The “obvious to try” analysis has also been affected in the district courts by the 
level of skill of the POSA.  In Alcon, the court considered a patent for an antibacterial eye 
drop.98  The court found the patent-in-suit was not obvious to try based, in part, on the 
POSA’s higher level of skill in the art.99  Because of the vast industry knowledge the 
 
might suggest based on the POSA’s knowledge of the art.  For example, if the “obvious to try” solution is 
within a family of pharmaceuticals but half of them have been ruled out for use in the industry due to side 
effects then, so long as the solution is within the other half of the drug family, the practitioner could argue 
that the number of solutions any POSA would have faced was actually smaller than the entire family.   
95 Alcon, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 443, 464 (D. Del. 2009) (noting that there 
was a long-felt need in the industry for a replacement drug, experts were skeptical of the investigation of 
another quinolone, that the patent covered the unexpected result that moxiflaxacin penetrated into and was 
retained by the eye, and that the commercial embodiment led to millions of dollars in sales).  See also In re 
Brimonidine Patent Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 429, 446 (D. Del. 2009) (Drug was a blockbuster, which was 
initially met by great skepticism, and others tried unsuccessfully to copy it.).  This phenomenon may be 
largely attributed to the district court’s interest in avoiding reversal and remand in the event the Federal 
Circuit believes the challenger actually made out a prima facie case for obviousness.    
96 See Avia Group Int'l v. L.A. Gear Cal., 853 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
97 See, e.g., Brimonidine, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 442; Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No. 06 CV 5571, 
2009 WL 2762706, at *11, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2009), vacated on other grounds, 2009 WL 3682179 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2009), reinstated in its entirety, 2010 WL 2730471, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 07, 2010).  
98 Alcon, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
99 Id. at 461–63.  
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POSA would have had, the court found that the POSA would have expected the patented 
drug to fail.100  The court found that the POSA, based on its knowledge of toxicity and 
the industry’s general distrust of Quinolones, would have tried a variety of other drugs 
before attempting a formulation with Quinolones.101  If this type of argument becomes 
common, it may mean fewer obviousness cases are resolved on summary judgment, since 
parties will become less willing to concede the Graham factual question of the POSA’s 
level of skill in the art, and the case will have to go to the jury to decide, at minimum, 
what the POSA’s level of skill is.102 
¶38 Other more creative arguments have come out of the district courts. For example, 
one party argued that KSR’s market pressures include the pressure felt by a 
pharmaceutical company at the “impending expiration of [its] patent” for a blockbuster 
drug.103  That argument is an extension of the market pressure doctrine.  It takes KSR’s 
holding that consumer demand is sufficient to motivate a POSA and applies it to a 
supplier’s desire to continue its monopoly. Another court found that the process utilized 
to determine solubility for a drug, where different from all other references, may also 
establish non-obviousness.104  This argument seems to be an extension of the “teaching 
away” doctrine, suggesting that a combination may not be obvious where the method or 
process utilized to find or test the pharmaceutical was itself unique, and other references 
taught away from the method of determining some part of the combination’s makeup.105   
¶39 Overall, chemical patents have been less affected than many initially expected, 
because the Federal Circuit’s guidance post-KSR left in place many of the previous tests 
for obviousness in the chemical context.  However, the reasoned path from a lead 
compound to the patent-in-suit offers an opportunity for structure around the obvious to 
try test.  If not policed to ensure sufficient flexibility, the reasoned path may become too 
rigid and provide ground for a Supreme Court challenge that leaves chemical patents in a 
state not unlike mechanical patents are today.   
C. Mechanical and Electrical Patents 
¶40 KSR’s effect on mechanical patents has been more pronounced, perhaps largely 
because the case dealt directly with mechanical arts, making it harder to distinguish.106  In 
 
100 See id. 
101 Id. at 462–63. 
102 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
103 Alcon, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 462–63. 
104 In re Brimonidine Patent Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 429, 443 (D. Del. 2009).  Note that this argument is 
different from process or methods claims which are affected by the recent Supreme Court decision In re 
Bilski.  Whereas Bilski affects the patentability of method or process claims, this argument suggests that a 
unique method, process, or test for reaching the claimed patented material may demonstrate that the 
material itself is non-obvious.  See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
105 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 413, 416 (2007).  In KSR, the court held that where 
prior art taught away from using a particular solution, the court may find the solution non-obvious, because 
the POSA was unlikely to try a solution that industry knowledge suggested would not work.  Brimonidine 
suggests a litigator can look behind the elements to the methods used to test the combination or combine 
the elements.  Even if those methods are not patented, they may be sufficient to make the combination non-
obvious. Brimonidine, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 443.   
106 Judge Markey suggested long before KSR that all mechanical patents are inevitably combination 
patents.  See Stratoflex Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Virtually all patents 
are ‘combination patents’ if by that label one intends to describe patents having claims to inventions 
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May 2007, the Federal Circuit considered Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc. 
Leapfrog appealed the district court’s order holding that Fisher-Price’s PowerTouch 
product (a reading tool for children) did not infringe Leapfrog’s U.S. Patent 5,813,861 
(“the ‘861 patent”) and that the patent was invalid as obvious.107  
¶41 After affirming the district court’s non-infringement finding, the Federal Circuit 
turned to Leapfrog’s obviousness argument.  Leapfrog claimed there was inadequate 
evidence to support a finding of motivation to combine the prior art.108  Fisher Price 
offered two patents that taught most of the elements of the Leapfrog product and argued 
the toy’s final version was simply an electronic update of the prior art.109  The Federal 
Circuit agreed. The court found that “accommodating a prior art mechanical device to 
modern electronics would have been reasonably obvious to one of ordinary skill in 
children’s learning devices.”110  The POSA would have combined the prior art references 
to gain market-driven benefits like “decreased size, increased reliability, simplified 
operation, and reduced cost.”111  Leapfrog is an application of two KSR principles.  First, 
a POSA is a person of ordinary creativity.  A POSA would apply technological advances 
to older mechanical patents to meet new market trends.112  Second, where market 
demands provide the POSA with motivation to combine the prior art, a patent is 
obvious.113  
¶42 In August 2007, the Federal Circuit considered In re Icon Health and Fitness, an 
appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences stemming from a reexamination 
of U.S. Patent No. 5,676,624 (“the ‘624 patent”), which taught a treadmill with a folding 
base supported by a gas spring.114  The gas spring helped hold the treadmill base upright 
for easy storage.115 
¶43 The Federal Circuit upheld the Board of Patent Appeals’ obviousness finding that a 
treadmill advertisement and U.S. Patent No. 4,370,766 by Teague (“the ‘766 patent”), 
which disclosed a folding bed using a gas spring, rendered the patent obvious.116  Icon 
argued that the ‘766 patent was irrelevant because it was outside the “treadmill art.”117  
The Federal Circuit found a POSA would have sought to solve the problem of holding 
the base in a closed position.  Relying on KSR, the court found that “[n]othing in Icon’s 
folding mechanism requires any particular focus on treadmills; it generally addresses 
problems supporting the weight of such a mechanism and providing a stable resting 
position” and therefore the prior art “may come from any area describing [those 
issues].”118  Since the ‘766 patent addresses the problem of holding a base in a closed 
 
formed of a combination of elements.  It is difficult to visualize, at least in the mechanical-structural arts, a 
‘non-combination’ invention; i.e. an invention consisting of a single element.  Such inventions, if they 
exist, are rare indeed.”) (emphasis in the original). 
107 Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
108 Id. at 1160. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 1160–61.  
111 Id. at 1162.  
112 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).  
113 Id. 
114 In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1379.  
118 Id. at 1380.  
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position, it offered a solution a POSA would have tried.  Moreover, the court found a 
“striking similarity” between Icon’s application and the ‘766 patent, which further 
supported the idea that one skilled in the art would combine the two.119 
¶44 In March 2008, the Federal Circuit looked at a “textbook case” of a combination by 
known methods to yield predictable results.120  In Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., the 
court considered U.S. Patent No. 5,949,636 (“the ‘636 patent”) which taught a method for 
building a rodent trap that electrocuted a pest when it came into contact with two 
electrodes: a high voltage electrode and a reference electrode.121  The two electrodes 
trigger a generator that produces a current sufficient to kill the rodent.122  The jury found 
the ‘636 patent non-obvious.  Woodstream moved for judgment as a matter of law which 
the district court denied.123  Woodstream appealed.  
¶45 The PTO had initially rejected the ‘636 patent based on three references (Agrizap 
owned one, U.S. Patent No. 5,269,091 (“the ‘091 patent”)), because the sole change 
between the three patents and the ‘636 patent was the use of a mechanical switch instead 
of a resistive switch to complete the circuit.124  Agrizap adjusted inventorship so that the 
‘091 and the ‘636 patent had the same inventor.125  Woodstream argued the PTO had 
been correct in the first place, because Agrizap had publicly revealed the commercial 
embodiment of the ‘091 patent at trade shows rendering the ‘636 patent obvious.  The 
Federal Circuit agreed.126  Moreover, the court upheld the obviousness determination 
over Agrizap’s secondary considerations including “the commercial success of the Rat 
Zapper, copying by Woodstream, and a long felt need in the market.”127 
¶46 Despite the suggestion of the case law reported above, the Federal Circuit has not 
found all mechanical or electrical patents obvious since KSR.128  But the court is not 
finding these patents non-obvious either.  The court is finding unanswered factual 
questions and remanding the cases to the district courts.  In Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation v. Buffalo Technology (USA), Inc., the court held that 
“a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether there was a motivation to combine 
prior art references.”129  In Commonwealth, the court considered U.S. Patent No. 
5,487,069 (“the ‘069 patent”) which taught a method for connecting wireless WLAN 
networks to avoid the problem of echo signals created when radio waves bounce off 
walls.130  Prior to KSR, the district court held the ‘069 patent non-obvious based on 
 
119 Id. at 1381.  
120 Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 530 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
121 Id. at 1339–40. 
122 Id. at 1340. 
123 Id. at 1341. 
124 Id. at 1343. 
125 Id. at 1344. 
126 Id.  The Court of Federal Claims invalidated a patent for navy sonar buoys based on the same 
reasoning and an Engineering Change Proposal which the court found qualified as an offer for sale.  See 
Sparton Corp. v. United States, No. 92-580 C, 2009 WL 2948555, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 10, 2009). 
127 Agrizap, 530 F.3d at 1344. 
128 See, e.g., Andersen Corp. v. Pella Corp., 300 F. App’x 893, 894 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reversing the 
district court’s decision granting summary judgment on obviousness because there existed a genuine issue 
of material fact regarding whether a POSA would have even considered the prior art on which the 
challengers relied in their obviousness analysis).   
129 Commonwealth Scientific and Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. (USA), Inc., 542 F.3d 1363, 
1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
130 Id. at 1367. 
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CSIRO’s argument that although the prior art contained all of the elements of the ‘069 
patent, it dealt with a problem that was not directly analogous.131  The Federal Circuit 
reversed and instructed the district court to apply KSR’s holding that any need or problem 
could supply a reason for combining known elements.132   
¶47 Commonwealth suggests that KSR’s more flexible obviousness standard may be 
shifting the obviousness battle to the factual stage over the POSA’s level of skill.  A 
POSA with a higher level of skill can either see more complexity in a problem or 
recognize more easily the obviousness of a solution than a POSA with a lower skill 
level.133  Similarly, a POSA with greater market experience may disregard potential 
solutions more quickly based on industry expectations that certain combinations will not 
work with one another.134  In short, the definition of the POSA’s level of skill in the art 
will have a significant effect on the outcome of the obviousness analysis, suggesting that 
the post-KSR obviousness analysis may generate more concern over the exact definition 
of the POSA.  Regardless, these cases put practitioners on notice that they must consider 
whether and how the factual question of the POSA’s level of skill will affect their legal 
analysis on obviousness.   
¶48 Thus, in the mechanical arts, KSR’s impact has been significant.135  While Icon is a 
clear extension of KSR’s admonition to broaden the base of the relevant prior art, 
Leapfrog suggests that mechanical patent lessons may be extended to the electronic arts, 
where the application of technological advances to known products will be treated as 
obvious.  The electronic expansion could have far-reaching consequences for a wide 
variety of electronic patent applications.  The rate of electronic expansion will depend on 
the Federal Circuit’s willingness to expand its technological advancement ideas in 
Leapfrog and on the district courts’ willingness to expand the doctrine at the lower level.   
D. District Courts and Mechanical Patents 
¶49 Mechanical patents have fared slightly better at the district court level than at the 
Federal Circuit.  The biggest problem for mechanical patent holders is that there are 
fewer opportunities than in the chemical arts to complicate the path of the POSA from 
two previously known ideas to the ultimate combination.  Moreover, the case law 
suggests that there are often fewer solutions to any given problem, which makes it easier 
to get to the “finite number of identified predictable solutions.”136  
 
131 Id. at 1373–75.  
132 Id. at 1375 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007)).  
133 See, e.g., Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1257–58 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (The 
Federal Circuit predicated error on the district court’s finding that a POSA was less specialized than the 
Federal Circuit believed the evidence showed.  Based on the heightened level of skill in the art, the court 
reversed the district court’s holding of non-obviousness.).  
134 See Commonwealth Scientific, 542 F.3d at 1374–75. 
135 See generally Li Li & Shuba Ghosh, Analysis of the KSR Ruling’s Impact on Electronics Patents 
(unpublished paper), available at http://works.bepress.com/shubha_ghosh/4 (documenting KSR’s effect on 
the electronics industry and suggesting a reversion to the TSM test for “cutting edge” electronics patents).  
Li and Ghosh are not alone in their argument for a reversion back to the TSM test.  See Randall J. Hirch, 
Note, Well Duh: Obviousness, Gas Pedals, and the Teaching-Suggestion-Motivation Test, 6 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 89 (2007).  For a broader, but conflicting view see Emer Simic, The TSM Test Is Dead! 
Long Live the TSM Test! The Aftermath of KSR, What Was All the Fuss About?, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 227 (2009) 
(arguing KSR had little or no impact on patent litigation). 
136 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). 
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¶50 Unlike chemical patents, where an analysis of sub-elements seems to offer some 
promising lines of argument, mechanical patents seem to survive an obviousness 
challenge one of two ways: either a perfect confluence of factors which render the patent 
non-obvious or a factual question which renders it procedurally impossible to decide 
obviousness on summary judgment.  The perfect confluence of factors is well 
demonstrated by Cimline, Inc. v. Crafco.  At issue was U.S. patent 5,967,375 (the ‘375 
patent) which taught the attachment of a mechanical conveyer belt leading to a box with 
flaps to concrete sealant melter trucks.137  The conveyer belt facilitated easy transport of 
the sealant blocks which were dropped into the truck to melt.138  The flaps prevented the 
500 degree liquid from splashing and injuring workers below.139  The ‘375 patent covered 
only the mechanical conveyer belt.140  The challenger pointed to previous embodiments 
of the product to suggest the patent was obvious.141  In rejecting the obviousness 
challenge, the court relied on four factors.  First, the court relied on the challenger’s 
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the patent was obvious.142  
Second, the court found that the burden, coupled with the fact that all of the relevant art 
was before the patent examiner, suggested the patent was non-obvious.143  Third, the 
court noted that the arguably simple modification took a decade to complete, a secondary 
consideration suggesting the patent was not obvious.144  Finally, the court found that the 
challenger failed to demonstrate that the POSA had a reasoned path to arrive at the patent 
in suit.145  By contrast, in Shuffle Master v. MP Games, the court offered a long and well-
reasoned decision explaining why U.S. Patent No. 5,781,647 was obvious, only to hold 
that factual questions about the scope of the prior art patent on which it relied prevented a 
summary judgment grant.146  
¶51 The district courts in mechanical cases also appear to be trying to integrate the 
Federal Circuit’s divergent application of KSR in the chemical and mechanical contexts.  
The court’s analysis in Cimline of the POSA’s reasoned path sounded more like a 
chemical case, because the court tracked the various choices the POSA had to make.  In 
Delta Frangible Ammunition v. Sinterfire, by contrast, the court rejected a patentee’s 
arguments that a copper bullet would have required “undue experimentation” and was not 
obvious to try, because the prior art gave no direction toward choosing copper.147  The 
court relied on Proctor & Gamble v. Takeda, a chemical case, holding “obviousness 
 




141 Id. at 924–25. 
142 Id. at 923. 
143 Id. at 926. 
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 925–28.  This deference suggests another strategy for litigants.  If already litigating a re-exam, 
trial lawyers should make sure the prior art cited in a concurrent patent suit is before the examiner.  
Assuming the patent survives the re-exam, it will also be more likely to survive the suit. 
146 Shuffle Master, Inc. v. MP Games LLC, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1226 (D. Nev. 2008).  Perhaps Shuffle 
Master suggests a new method for disposing of patent cases?  Judge Reed’s opinion may have been 
intended as a signal to the parties that both faced significant risk if the case went to trial and they should 
consider settlement.  Otherwise, the detailed explanation of obviousness makes little sense since Judge 
Reed could have disposed of the summary judgment issue on the factual question without ever reaching the 
obviousness analysis. 
147 Delta Frangible Ammunition, LLC v. Sinterfire, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 2d 405, 412–13 (W.D. Pa. 2009).  
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cannot be avoided simply by a showing of some degree of unpredictability in the art so 
long as there was a reasonable probability of success.”148  Practitioners seeking to protect 
a mechanical patent should review the chemical cases and attempt to analogize the 
complication of the chemical patents to the mechanical one at issue in their case.   
IV. EMERGING PATTERNS AND THE ROAD AHEAD 
¶52 The analysis leaves one question unanswered.  Post-KSR, what are the successful 
lines of argument and how can a practitioner best develop his or her case to take full 
advantage of them?   
¶53 First, as the case review here demonstrates, the bar for proving nonobviousness of 
mechanical patents has been raised.  Leapfrog suggests the same bar may apply to high-
tech electronics and potentially, by extension, some forms of computer industry 
patents.149  Meanwhile, the effect on the pharmaceutical industry is less pronounced than 
many first feared.  That result is due, in large part, to the Federal Circuit.  The Federal 
Circuit has emphasized the complexity and unpredictability of the chemical arts, which 
suggests for lower courts that they are different than the mechanical or electronic arts.  
Moreover, Federal Circuit decisions interpreting KSR have reduced the impact of the 
“obvious to try” doctrine by limiting what constitutes a number of “finite predictable” 
solutions in chemical cases to a “few.” 
¶54 Practitioners seeking to protect a patent from an obviousness challenge should 
build a storyline that creates a number of decision points for a POSA and complicates, as 
much as possible, each decision so that the ultimate path the POSA must take to arrive at 
the patent-in-suit seems far from obvious.  The chemical patent cases provide good 
examples of successful arguments that can and should be analogized to other areas.150  
The reverse is true for practitioners seeking to invalidate for obviousness.  The path for 
the POSA must be simple and clear.  In the chemical context, there must be a reasoned 
analysis for the POSA’s lead compound choice and then a clearly reasoned and relatively 
simple path to the final solution.  The cases suggest that deluging the court with a large 
number of prior art references (a norm in patent cases) is less persuasive in a chemical 
arts case.  More likely, it will offer the opposing side a citation to argue the prior art 
taught away from the suggested solution and suggest to the court that the path is unclear.  
¶55 Once the POSA’s path is clear, motivating factors become most important.  
Motivating factors in particular provide an area where litigants need not be automatons.  
Like the POSA in KSR, the motivating factors litigants present may come from creative 
places.  Litigants should look to market forces (e.g. Alcon), unsolved needs (e.g. 
Perrigo), and technological advancements (e.g. Leapfrog) that might apply to the patent.  
Practitioners should also look to differing but related fields (e.g. Icon or Pfizer v. Apotex) 
that might provide a POSA’s inspiration.  
 
148 Id. at 414 (citing Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 
2009)).  In fact, the “case present[ed] a textbook example ‘where a skilled artisan merely pursued known 
options from a finite number of identified predictable solutions.’”  Id. at 416. 
149 See also Li & Ghosh, supra note 1355, at 20.   
150 At least some district courts seem open to cross-citation to the chemical arts patent cases in the 
mechanical arts context.  See, e.g., Sensormatic Elecs. Corp. v. Tag Co. US, LLC, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 
1175 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008)). 
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¶56 Unfortunately for the litigator, much of what makes a strong case for validation 
occurs years before the litigation begins, at the prosecution stage.  While claim 
construction allows for some variability in definition, the ability to say that a mechanical 
patent has complicated elements must be colorable based on the patent’s original 
language.  Patent prosecution attorneys will do well to include more rather than less prior 
art before the PTO, as one of the most successful arguments for validity arises out of the 
clear and convincing burden placed on a challenger.  When all of the art the challenger 
cites is before the patent examiner, the challenger’s task becomes significantly harder.151   
¶57 Finally, litigators must consider potential procedural arguments.  The importance of 
the POSA’s level of skill in the art for determining what is obvious to try or within the 
POSA’s creativity has already begun to place more emphasis on the Graham factors.  
The level of skill is certainly a material fact in the obviousness analysis and could push 
more patent cases to trial.  Should this trend be pushed to its ultimate fruition, the 
Supreme Court may face a Twombly-like question at the summary judgment stage with 
patent law forming the substantive basis for the challenge.152  In other words, the court 
may need to determine when a party has proven facts sufficient to set the level of the skill 
in the art.  Exactly what such a challenge might look like is outside the scope of this 
article.  
¶58 Another potential challenge to the law is a KSR-like challenge for chemical patents.  
In the event that the Federal Circuit’s lead compound test continues to make it easier to 
protect chemical patents, practitioners could argue that the flexibility the Supreme Court 
infused into the TSM test has been lost on the chemical patent side.  Such a challenge 
would most likely have to be framed as a question about the viability of the lead 
compound test but might follow the analysis in KSR as a guide.  Again, a full exposition 
of what such a challenge might look like is outside the scope of this article.   
V. CONCLUSION: THE ROAD AHEAD 
¶59 Thousands of pages have already been spent on how KSR altered patent litigation.  
There is no doubt that patents have become harder to secure in the post-KSR world.  The 
question is how much has it really changed litigation?  The answer varies based on which 
area of patentable science one analyzes.  
¶60 Mechanical patents are simply harder to defend against an obviousness challenge in 
the post-KSR world.  While the Federal Circuit has offered clarifying factors in the 
chemical context, none seem to be forthcoming for mechanical patents.  Thus, litigators 
face an uncertain world.  Chemical patents, while governed by a clearer test, are on a 
road that could result in a challenge similar to KSR that charges the lower courts with 
ignoring the flexibility requirement of KSR in the chemical context.  Mechanical 
patentees, meanwhile, face a world where it seems that almost nothing mechanical is 
non-obvious. 
 
151 If the patent is before the PTO on a reexamination anyway, it is worthwhile to make sure that all art 
and expert reports submitted in the litigation are before the PTO during the re-exam.  If the patent survives, 
it makes the case against it much less strong.  See generally, Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No. 06 CV 
5571, 2009 WL 2762706, at *11, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2009), vacated on other grounds, 2009 WL 
3682179 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2009), reinstated in its entirety, 2010 WL 2730471, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 07, 
2010)). 
152 See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
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¶61 The division based on the type of patent means litigators who defend 
interdisciplinary patents should emphasize the more complex art as much as possible.  
For example, medical device and process patents can have both mechanical and chemical 
or biological elements in them.  If the litigator can increase the relevance of the non-
mechanical portions of the patent, she will be in a more structured and harder-to-
invalidate portion of the obviousness test.  Perhaps the best opportunity to protect these 
patents from an obviousness challenge is at the prosecution stage.  Patents covering 
interdisciplinary fields should integrate, to the extent possible, the more complex (e.g. 
chemical) arts into as many claims as possible. 
¶62 The division between arts is likely to continue over the next several years and 
probably become more entrenched.  There are some signs, however, that district courts 
are not applying the division between the arts as directly as the Federal Circuit and are 
borrowing concepts from the chemical cases for mechanical patents.  Ultimately the 
analysis shows that practitioners live in a more stable world three years post-KSR, but 
many questions still remain open and unanswered.   
